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Information Design with Large Language Models

Apr 10, 2026·
Tao Lin
Tao Lin
· 0 min read
Abstract
Presentation for our working paper “Information Design with Large Language Models”.
Event
Boston Economics and Computing Hub (BEACH) Workshop
Location

Boston College

Massachusetts, USA

Last updated on Apr 10, 2026
Tao Lin
Authors
Tao Lin
PhD in Computer Science
Non-Bayesian Information Design: Learning and LLM-Based Approaches Jan 7, 2026 →

© 2026. This work is licensed under CC BY NC ND 4.0

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