We study a repeated Bayesian persuasion problem (and more generally, any generalized principal-agent problem with complete information) where the principal does not have commitment power and the agent uses algorithms to learn to respond to the …
We consider multiple senders with informational advantage signaling to convince a single self-interested actor towards certain actions. Generalizing the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework, such settings are ubiquitous in computational economics, …
We consider a Bayesian forecast aggregation model where n experts, after observing private signals about an unknown binary event, report their posterior beliefs about the event to a principal, who then aggregates the reports into a single prediction …
The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that, under …