notes

Persuading a Behavioral Agent: Approximately Best Responding and Learning

The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that, under …

How Does Independence Help Generalization? Sample Complexity of ERM on Product Distributions

While many classical notions of learnability (e.g., PAC learnability) are distribution-free, utilizing the specific structures of an input distribution may improve learning performance. For example, a product distribution on a multi-dimensional input …

On Clearing Prices in Matching Markets: A Simple Characterization without Duality

Duality of linear programming is a standard approach to the classical weighted maximum matching problem. From an economic perspective, the dual variables can be regarded as prices of products and payoffs of buyers in a two-sided matching market. …